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Background
In the Lao PDR water supply services fall into two main 
categories:
• Nam Papa State Owned Enterprises (NPSEs) – Urban 
water supply.
• Nam Saat – Rural water supply.
This paper focuses on the former, with the rural water schemes 
considered to be self-regulating activities with limited need 
for additional regulatory oversight.
Until 1999, Nam Papa Lao was operating as the sole 
state-owned enterprise responsible for the provision of urban 
water supply services throughout the Lao PDR (generally 
confined to the provincial capitals and some district capitals). 
In 1999, the government decentralised the urban water sup-
ply structure creating 18 provincial NPSEs.
Although the utilities were decentralised, the government 
retained direct control over capital investment in the sector 
and created the Water Supply Authority (WASA) as the 
principal investment channel for donor-funded projects. It 
was also recognised that decentralisation required effective 
regulation even though there was no clear understanding 
as to what form of regulation was most appropriate for the 
Lao PDR. The government therefore added regulation of the 
sector to the overall responsibilities of WASA, a decision 
that was later recognised as less than ideal.
The WASA Regulatory Board, comprised of representa-
tives of various economic and social interest groups, lies 
between WASA and the government. Its role is to set overall 
regulatory policy with the WASA executive responsible for 
its interpretation and implementation. 
In 2000, WASA embarked on an Asian Development 
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Bank (ADB) funded capital investment programme for the 
development of water supply services in several towns within 
the Lao PDR. This programme was supported by the Nor-
wegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), 
and in September 2000 the consulting firm, Interconsult 
International, was appointed to provide technical assistance 
to both concerned NPSEs and WASA, including assistance 
towards the development of WASA as the sector regulator.
Regulation in the Lao PDR: 1999 - 2001
The fundamentals
The general understanding of regulation in the Lao PDR 
in the early days was limited. It was therefore necessary to 
start from first principles for which several workshops and 
training sessions were initiated by the consultant. These 
early activities focussed on the reasons for regulation and 
foundation concepts.
In a perfectly competitive market, price and quality are 
determined by the laws of supply and demand. Water sup-
Box 1. Water supply – an imperfect market
Operators are natural local monopolies with inherent inef-
ficiencies
Water is a single quality product and the customer is not free 
to choose alternative products or services at different prices 
and qualities, and
Water supply, as a basic human need, is often subject to pres-
sure from political interest groups, especially with respect to 
tariffs.
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ply services, however, do not operate in a perfect market 
(see Box 1).
Regulation is required to redress these market imperfec-
tions by acting as a surrogate to competition utilising the 
most appropriate tools available, namely:
• Enforcement of statutory regulations that set out the legal 
obligations of the water supply businesses;
• The promotion of an environment that is attractive for 
investment;
• The promotion of continual improvement in service 
delivery through comparative competition; 
• Price control through tariffs to ensure a fair price to the 
customers, yet at the same time protecting the operating 
units’ financial positions from political interference.
Additional regulatory functions include guidance for gov-
ernment in: technical, legal, financial, social and economic 
areas in relation to water supply services.
It is important to note that regulation, as a surrogate for 
competition,  does not involve managing the businesses but 
rather setting performance targets and objectives in order to 
improve overall operational performance and value.
Institutional conflict
Although the remit of WASA as a regulator was accepted 
in law WASA’s capacity to regulate the sector in the early 
years was handicapped by WASA’s primary role as a chan-
nel for capital investment. Regulation was, at that time, 
a secondary activity of limited importance. Furthermore, 
this dual function of WASA led to potential conflicts of 
interest, e.g. WASA, as a channel for investment, actively 
sought funding for its investment projects whereas WASA, 
the regulator, was expected to challenge these investment 
decisions. Fortunately, this conflict was substantially re-
solved in 2003 by the removal of the capital investment 
responsibilities, transferred to the Department of Housing 
and Urban Planning. WASA was then left to dedicate itself 
to regulation. As both institutions still fall within the same 
ministry, further separation is desirable but of relatively low 
priority at this stage.
The first steps
WASA’s initial challenge in regulation was to gain not only an 
understanding of regulation but also an understanding of the 
sector, its problems, needs and aspirations. WASA’s technical 
staff had a reasonable grasp of the technical problems. and 
the technical solutions available, mostly through increased 
capital investment and improved operational practices. 
There was, however, limited understanding as to the root 
causes of these problems, many of them non-technical but 
rather financial, social, and political; and certainly no clear 
understanding as to how they could be resolved.
WASA’s capacity to regulate depended entirely upon its 
understanding of the sector resulting in a concerted drive to 
get to grips with the non-technical issues such as financial 
management, institutional and legal structures, social factors 
and political considerations. Resource constraints limited this 
exercise to the analysis of the 12 NPSEs that were directly 
affected by the ADB investment programme through the 
sub-project feasibility studies. Although not a comprehensive 
review of all 18 NPSEs, the work was considered sufficient 
for broad conclusions to be drawn as being representative 
of the sector nationally.
The principal conclusions of these early analyses were:
1. The financial structures were invariably weak; at best 
the accounts were maintained in accordance with the 
government accounting regulations.
2. The tariffs were set by local political authorities with 
limited regard for financial requirements.
3. The operational efficiencies of the NPSEs were well below 
what could be expected of a reasonably well functioning 
utility.
4. The financial integrities of the NPSEs were threatened by 
poor cash collection (largely as a result of non-payment 
by government agencies).
5. A high degree of customer dissatisfaction with the services 
they receive.
At this early stage of the regulatory development process 
it was considered appropriate for the results of such analy-
ses to be kept out of the public domain without first giving 
the NPSEs the opportunity to respond and improve their 
performance. In future years WASA intended to undertake 
more comprehensive analyses and for the results to be place 
in the public domain.
 In late 2001, a significant event took place that raised 
WASA’s regulatory profile (see Box 2).
Box 2. Nam Papa Vientiane Prefecture Tariff Review
In late 2001, the Government had been approached by Nam 
Papa Vientiane Capital City (NPNL), by far the largest of the 18 
NPSEs, for a substantial tariff increase. Rather than undertake 
its own review of the increase, as had been the case in the past, 
the Government passed the application on to WASA for their 
comments and recommendations.
Absent of any firm tariff policy at that time of the regulatory de-
velopment process, WASA was only able to undertake the tariff 
analysis on a simple ‘cost of service’ basis-a less than perfect 
method. However, the analysis did give WASA the opportunity 
to impart several key messages to the Government and NPV 
about the weaknesses in the current financial management 
systems that are not appropriate for effective and fair pricing. It 
also brought the Government’s attention to several factors not 
previously considered in tariff adjustments, notably concepts 
such as return on capital, capital maintenance, regulatory asset 
values and the like.
The conclusions reached at that time suggested that there was a 
good case for an upwards adjustment, although not necessarily 
for the reasons cited in the original application.
This exercise did, however, raise WASA’s profile in the eyes of 
Government and the management of the largest water provider 
in the country.
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Legal and institutional development
During the early years of WASA it became apparent that the 
legal instruments setting out WASA’s remit and powers were 
inadequate. There was no guidance in law as to the principal 
objectives of WASA as a regulator, very few regulations 
existed and (of those that did) there was no reference to 
WASA as the principal enforcement agency.
The Terms of Reference of the technical assistance project 
recognised these weaknesses and called for assistance to 
WASA to develop a ‘charter’, although no-one really knew 
what this ‘charter’ was supposed to cover and under what 
legal basis it would take. A prolonged period of discussion 
resulted in the agreement that the ‘charter’ should be a legal 
instrument, preferably a Prime Ministerial Decision, that 
clearly sets out the objectives and powers of WASA as well 
as the rights and obligations of the principal stakeholders in 
the sector, notably the NPSEs and their customers. Towards 
the end of 2001, the development of the ‘WASA Charter’ 
(as it came to be known), commenced, although it would 
take a few more years for it to become law.
Water quality regulation
In the Lao PDR water quality does not demand as high a 
level of importance as it does in many other countries, pri-
marily due to the widespread accepted practice of bottled 
water being used for drinking, with the piped water supply 
generally used for washing and sanitation.
However, this does not absolve the NPSEs of their respon-
sibilities to provide clean potable water and it is up to WASA 
to ensure that this obligation is met. In reality, WASA does 
not have, nor is likely to have in the near future, the technical 
and financial resources necessary to provide the inspection 
services to effectively regulate water quality. The approach 
adopted by WASA is therefore based upon self-regulation 
with WASA acting as an auditor.
In practice only Nam Papa Vientiane Capital City has the 
facilities to comprehensively test water quality. Elsewhere 
water quality monitoring is limited to residual chlorine 
testing at best. Consequently, any obligatory water quality 
standards are meaningless until such time that testing facili-
ties are in place. WASA’s first step was the preparation of 
draft water quality legislation setting out specific timetables 
for the establishment of appropriate testing facilities, either 
in-house, or shared with a neighbouring NPSE or even em-
ploying the services of an outside testing agency. Once these 
facilities are in place water quality compliance is required 
soon thereafter.
Regulation in the Lao PDR: 2002 – 2004
Vision and mission statements
WASA’s corporate identity and direction is set out in its vi-
sion and mission statements (announced in 2003):
Our vision
“A first class water supply infrastructure that delivers the 
highest service possible that represents best value to custom-
ers now and in the future”
Our mission
“To regulate in a way that provides a potable, sustainable 
and affordable water supply for all by 2015.”
Regulation through comparative competition
The pace of development of regulation in the water sup-
ply sector accelerated in 2002. Without any legal powers 
of enforcement for most of the time it has been operating 
,WASA has had to rely on other mechanisms principally 
comparative competition. This involves the publication of the 
performances, both technical and financial, of the operators 
providing an incentive for the management of the NPSEs 
to improve, either to rise to the levels of the best or at least 
not to be amongst the worst. The results of these reviews 
were, in the first instance, kept within government and not 
placed in the public domain.
At the end of 2002 WASA embarked on a significantly 
more revolutionary approach. Performance data from all 18 
NPSEs for 2002 was analysed and compiled into a single 
and public Annual Water Sector Performance Report. This 
document included summary comparisons of NPSE perform-
ance allowing their customers to see how their supplier is 
performing in relation to others in the Lao PDR. This report 
illustrates performance graphically allowing easy to read 
comparisons to be made (refer Figure 1)
Aside from being a motivator for improved performance 
it also helps to boost the confidence of investors, donor 
agencies and other stakeholders
Figure 1. Water loss performance
Source: WASA Annual Water Sector Performance 
Report 2002
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regulatory purposes only). These factors include separation 
of core activities from consolidated accounts (ring fencing), 
recalculation of depreciation on a current cost basis and a 
similar adjustment to asset valuations.
Following on from the regulatory accounts WASA has 
developed a detailed ‘Tariff Determination Methodology’ 
employing longer run discounted cash flow techniques and 
other pricing tools.
The Tariff Policy, Regulatory Accounting Guidelines and 
the Tariff Determination Methodology  are currently being 
employed to determine the tariffs of the NPSEs with effect 
from January 2005.
Regulation in the Lao PDR - the future
The immediate future of WASA is economic regulation 
through tariff determinations. WASA intends to set the tariffs 
for the period 2005 to 2007 inclusive (subject to inflation 
linked adjustments) based upon the application of the Tariff 
Policy and other regulatory tools.
Future tariff determination exercises will include more 
complex determination methods that pass on efficiency 
gains to the customers yet still maintaining the financial 
integrity of the NPSEs.
The introduction of private sector investment in the sector 
will undoubtedly present further challenges to the tariff de-
termination process incorporating market-related returns on 
capital, investment and efficiency incentives and the like.
Regulation, like market competition, is a never-ending proc-
ess that will continue to improve the value of services. The 
achievements of WASA to date have been exceptional despite 
the limited resources and powers at WASA’s disposal. With 
the increased resources and powers that are expected as a 
result of the WASA Charter and further development of the 
institution, it is believed that WASA can continue to be a 
major force for good in the urban water supply sector.
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The WASA charter
The preparation of draft legislation for the WASA charter 
gathered pace in 2002 and was very much complete by mid-
2003. This included a broad consultation process. However, 
such an important legal instrument requires detailed scrutiny 
by higher political and legal authorities including the Ministry 
of Justice and the Prime Minister’s Office. At the time of the 
preparation of this paper this charter had not been officially 
approved but final approval and enactment was expected by 
the end of the second quarter of 2004.
This Charter effectively transfers much of the regulatory 
responsibility from the local political bodies, generally the 
Provincial Governors’ (PG) offices, to WASA.
It also sets out the responsibilities of the Regulatory Board 
in setting overall policy with interpretation and implementa-
tion left to the WASA executive. Unfortunately, this Regula-
tory Board has not developed as intended with WASA still 
largely responsible for both policy and implementation. It 
is hoped that the Board will become more actively involved 
as WASA develops.
Until now WASA has been operating on the basis that this 
Charter will be approved.
Water Tariff Policy of the Lao PDR
The WASA Charter requires the development of a Tariff 
Policy based upon:
• Consumer interest and affordability
• Supplier costs of service provision
• The environment
• National economic policy
By mid-2003 WASA had developed a Tariff Policy that 
brought together all the above considerations into a single 
cohesive strategy. The principal foci of this tariff policy are 
social fairness, affordability and cost recovery. This Tariff 
Policy was presented to several communities for their con-
sideration and received general acceptance, although there 
were occasional understandable objections based upon the 
self interests of particular individuals or groups. Finally, the 
Minister for MCTPC officially established the Water Tariff 
Policy on 26 April 2004 and was later approved by the Prime 
Minister on 7 May 2004.
Regulatory accounting guidelines and tariff 
determination methodology
The NPSEs are obliged to maintain their accounts in strict 
accordance with the Lao PDR government accounting sys-
tem. Although effective in monitoring public expenditure it 
is not appropriate for pricing; accounts include commercial 
activities such as bottled water plants and depreciation and 
asset valuations are based upon historic cost accounting and 
do not reflect real charges and values. In early 2004, WASA 
developed its ‘Regulatory Accounting Guidelines’ that 
redresses the shortcomings of the government accounting 
system by specifying certain adjustments to the accounts (for 
